SMOKE, NOT FIRE
Neal Devins*
One week before the 2004 presidential election, Chief Justice William Rehnquist disclosed
that he underwent a tracheotomy in connection with a recent diagnosis of thyroid cancer.1 That
announcement left little doubt that the winner of the 2004 election would reshape the face of the
Supreme Court. That announcement, however, fell on deaf ears. The press gave limited attention to
the story and neither John Kerry nor George Bush used the announcement to focus attention on the
Supreme Court. Not surprisingly, the Chief Justice=s announcement had no impact on the
electorate: Exit polls revealed that the Supreme Court was a non-factor in the presidential election.
In one poll, no voter (out of 1200 polled) ranked the Supreme Court as the most important factor in
their decision.2 In another poll, fewer than .5% of 900 people polled ranked the Supreme Court as
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Against this backdrop, one would think that Congress sees the judiciary as a low salience
issueBsomething that does not merit time or attention. Think again. Over the past five years, the
courts have been the whipping boy of both the left and the right. Liberals have condemned the Court
for engaging in Aconservative judicial activism;@ conservatives, among other things, have proposed
stripping the courts of jurisdiction on same sex marriage and the pledge of allegiance.4
What gives? If both sides have bones to pick with the Court, why not treat the Court as an
important election issue? In the pages that follow, I will provide an explanation of sorts for the
disjunction between lawmaker complaints about the Court and the Court=s apparent irrelevance to
the electorate. Specifically, I will argue that conservatives and liberals castigate the Court in order
to secure support among their base. These attacks, however, are purely rhetorical. Conservatives
and liberals are not upset with the Court. For reasons I will soon detail, the Rehnquist Court
typically pays close attention to the signals sent it by Congress and the American people. More than
that, lawmakers understand that the aggressive pursuit of Court-curbing measures might come back
to haunt them at the polls. Throughout our nation=s history, Amedian voters@ have supported
judicial independence.5

Put another way: Rhetorical attacks on the Court serve the interests of

lawmakers (by securing their base); heart-felt aggressive attacks against the Court may alienate
median voters.

4

See infra.

5

Barry Friedman has written several articles on this topic, including Judging Judicial
Review: Marbury in the Modern Era, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596 (2003) and Judicial Review and
Judicial Independence: Things Forgotten in the Debate Over Judicial Independence, 14 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 737 (1998). For additional discussion, see infra.
3

*

*

*

It would be wrong to label the Rehnquist Court as either liberal or conservative.6 On the one
hand, the Court has backed numerous liberal causes: abortion, affirmative action, campaign finance,
gay rights, school prayer, Miranda, constitutional protections for enemy combatants, and free
speech on the internet. On the other hand, the Court helped hand George Bush the 2000 presidential
election. Moreover, its revival of federalism resulted in the invalidation of legislation regulating
firearms, domestic violence, and anti-discrimination measures protecting the aged, disabled, and
religious minorities.
In making sense of these disparate rulings, I am quite convincedBas Robert Dahl put it in
1957Bthat the Court=s constitutional decisions Aare never for long out of line with the policy views
dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United States.@7 The Court=s 1992 reaffirmation
of Roe is linked to the Senate=s rejection of Robert Bork in 1987 and public support for limited
abortion rights; its approval of affirmative action in 2003 seems very much tied to the fact that
elected officials, business interests, and elites strongly supported race preferences in education; most
telling, its revival of federalism can be traced to public and lawmaker support for devolving power
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away from Washington D.C. and to the states.8
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By issuing decisions that match the social and political forces that beat against it, lawmakers
have not been pressured by voters or interest groups to curb the Court. More than that, the American
people favor judicial independence, especially when Supreme Court decisions do not upset
majoritarian preferences.9 Perhaps for this reason, a June 2001 poll revealed that eighty percent of
Americans have Asome,@ Aquite a lot,@ or a Agreat deal@ of confidence in the Supreme Court.10
Against this backdrop, lawmakers understand that there are real costs in pursuing Courtcurbing proposals.11 That does not mean, however, that lawmakers do not have reason to bad mouth
the judiciary. Indeed, the growing ideological divide in Congress creates incentives for both liberals
and conservatives to strengthen their base by engaging in political grandstanding.
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Let me explain: Ever since 1980, an ever-growing ideological gap has separated Democrats
and Republicans. In the House of Representatives, for example, the most liberal Republican is more
conservative than the most conservative Democrat.12 One outgrowth of this phenomenon is that
lawmakers, especially in the House, are not interested in appealing to centrist voters. In particular,
with computer-driven redistricting guaranteeing that Democrats will win certain seats and
Republicans other seats, the party primary often controls who will win the election.13 Not
surprisingly, lawmakers pay increasing attention to the partisans who vote in the primaries.
In an effort to secure their base, Democrats and Republicans are increasingly concerned with
Amessage politics,@ that is, using the legislative process to make a symbolic statement to voters and
other constituents.14 Lawmakers, moreover, turn more and more to so-called Aposition taking@
legislation. AThe electoral requirement [of such measures] is not that [a lawmaker] make pleasing
things happen but that he make pleasing judgmental statements.@15 Correspondingly, even if a
judicial ruling barely registers with voters and interest groups, lawmakers may nevertheless firm up
their base by taking a position on supposed judicial overreaching.
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Consider, for example, Senate Democrat claims that the Rehnquist Court engaged in
Aconservative judicial activism@ and House Republican efforts to prevent Aactivist@ judges from
voiding the pledge of allegiance, embracing same sex marriage, and looking to foreign law when
deciding cases. Rather than express heartfelt disappointment with Supreme Court decisions,
Republicans and Democrats both used the Ajudicial activism@ label to solidify their base and, in so
doing, distance themselves from each other.
In the wake of the 2000 presidential election (and, with it, Bush v. Gore), Senate Democrats
launched their campaign against conservative judicial activism. ContendingBin the words of then
Senate Judiciary Chair Patrick LeahyBthat the Supreme Court was stacked with Aideologically
conservative Republican appointees@ and that the Adominant flavor of judicial activism is right
wing,@16 Senate Democrats called attention to differences between their message and that of the
President and his party. Through newspaper editorials, floor statements, television appearances, and
through hearings, Senate Democrats advanced a two-pronged message, namely: (1) the Rehnquist
Court=s federalism campaign is Aconservative,@ Aactivist,@ and targeting civil rights and individual
liberties, and (2) Democrats must work hard to ensure ideological balance on a Supreme Court run
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amok.17 AWhat we=re trying to do,@ said Senator Charles Schumer, Ais set the stage and make sure
that both the White House and the Senate Republicans know [what] we expect.@18
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Senate Democrats had good reason to launch this attack on the Court. By suggesting that
their vision of the federal judiciary (a Court that protects civil and individual rights) is at odds with
the Republican vision, Democrats appealed to their base. More than that, the Aconservative judicial
activism@ label served both as a rallying call and cover to Democratic efforts to prevent President
Bush from appointing conservative judges and Justices. At the same time, there is little reason to
think that Democrats, in fact, were especially disappointed with Supreme Court decisions
invalidating federal statutes. A search of the Congressional Record reveals that lawmakers did not
discussBlet alone criticizeBthese rulings.19 Likewise, lawmakers did not openly challenge these
rulings through proposed legislation or constitutional amendments.20 This disjunction between
Senate Democrat claims about the Rehnquist Court and lawmaker responses to Rehnquist Court
rulings strongly suggests that the Aconservative judicial activism@ label was little more than a
rhetorical device.
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House Republican efforts to strip federal court jurisdiction are cut from a similar cloth.
Sponsors of these measures did not want to enact legislation countermanding the Supreme Court;
instead, they wanted to make a symbolic statement. Republican leaders of the House Judiciary
Committee, for example, never bothered to take a vote on a proposal (sponsored by 74 Republicans
from well-established red states and Ohio) to prevent federal courts from making use of foreign
law.21 Introduced on March 17, 2004, the Committee held a two hour hearing on March 25 and then
let the matter drop.22 Likewise, House Republicans never intended to give the Senate a chance to
vote on legislation that would restrict court power over same-sex marriage and the pledge of
allegiance. The same sex marriage bill23 was introduced in October 2003 (one month before the
Massachusetts Supreme Court recognized same sex marriage) but was not voted on until July 22,
2004 (one week after the Senate rejected a proposed constitutional amendment on same sex
marriage). Approved by a party line vote of 233 to 194, the bill was referred to the Senate on
September 7, 2004 (less than three weeks before Congress=s pre-election recess). The timing of
the Pledge Protection Act24 is an even more dramatic illustration of House uninterest in getting the
bill to the Senate in time for meaningful Senate considerations. First referred to the House Judiciary
Committee in May 2002, no action was taken on the pledge bill until the Judiciary Committee
ordered it reported on September 15, 2004. That left enough time for the House to vote and approve
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the bill on September 24 but not enough time to refer it to the Senate.
The timing of the pledge bill and same sex marriage bill are certainly suggestive. More
significant, unlike nearly all court-stripping proposals, these bills have little to do with federal court
decisions upsetting to lawmakers. True, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against the pledge
in Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Nedow.25 But lawmakers waited (more than two years) for the
Supreme Court to dismiss Nedow on standing grounds before taking up the bill.26 More than that,
when dismissing Nedow, 3 Justices signaled their support for the pledge and no Justice suggested
that the Ninth Circuit decision was correct.27
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The same sex marriage bill is an even clearer example of Congress tackling an issue for
symbolic reasons. No federal court had found a constitutional right to same-sex marriage. Indeed,
no federal court had invalidated the Defense of Marriage Act, legislation that would protect state
prerogatives over same sex marriage. And while the federal courts might someday extend the
Supreme Court=s recognition of same sex sodomy in Lawrence v Texas, the triggering event for this
proposal were Athe demands of four unelected members of Massachusetts= State Supreme Court
who have overturned the laws of the State of Massachusetts and sanctioned same sex marriage.@28
In other words, lawmakers were responding to something they had absolutely no authority to police.
House Republicans were not dissuaded by such legal niceties. Their aim was to score points
with their base by making judgmental statement about the sanctity of heterosexual marriage. After
all, the November 2004 elections were weeks away and Republican strategists had identified same
sex marriage as a linchpin of their efforts to make moral values the focus of their efforts to reelect
the president and strengthen the GOP=s hold over Congress.29
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That Democrats and Republicans in Congress see the Court as a rhetorical whipping boy is
hardly surprising. Voters typically see the judiciary as a low salience issue. Consequently,
increasingly ideological lawmakers can play to their increasingly partisan base by condemning
Aactivist@ judges (even state judges!). It simply does not matter that lawmakers are not all that
upset with the Court. What matters is that lawmakers can speak to issues that resonate with their
base and, in so doing, call attention to differences between the two parties.
Ironically, lawmakers might pay a price if they were truly upset with the Court. Popular
support for judicial independence may be sufficiently strong that the enactment of court stripping
proposals might prompt a political backlash. The true test of this proposition is yet to come. As
congressional districts become increasingly polarized and as presidential races turn more and more
on the ability of each side to bring out their base, it may be that the conventional wisdom about
judicial independence will give way to a new era of winner-takes-all politics.
In the meantime, the Rehnquist Court will fade from view without testing the willingness of
Democrats or Republicans to push through draconian anti-Court measures. By issuing decisions that
largely reflect majoritarian norms, the Rehnquist Court did not prompt the true ire of either
Democrats or Republicans. . For that reason, newspapers, voters, and presidential candidates did not
pay much attention to the Chief Justice=s cancer diagnosis and, with it, the Court.
Put another way: In this era of ideological polarization, it is inevitable that lawmakers will
launch rhetorical attacks against the courts. The fact that Court decisions reflected majoritarian
norms is simply beside the point. But so long as the Court steers a centrist course, ongoing attacks
against the judiciary, as the title of this piece suggests, should be understood as little more than
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smoke. The fires associated with a paradigm shift of Court-Congress relations are not yet upon us.
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